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This paper assesses the relative participation of Argentina, Brazil, Gua-
temala and Nicaragua in fragmented world production. Based on trade 
statistics from 2000 to 2004, it analyses whether the trade ß ows of these 
economies have evolved towards production sharing schemes and how 
great this type of trade is in order to sustain their presence into the world 
economy. Guatemala and Nicaragua hold a moderate participation in a 
global production chain under a North-South trade pattern. Nonetheless, 
their participation is threatened by international competition and their 
dependence on a unique market. Brazil has consolidated participation into 
few chains of production showing a more diversiÞ ed North–South trade pattern. 
Argentina has attained insertion into the automotive chain of production 
whereas its participation in other ones is still limited. The country has a more 
South-South trade pattern, which exposes it to a certain degree of dependence.
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En este trabajo se evalúa  la participación relativa de Argentina, Brasil, 
Guatemala y Nicaragua en la producción segmentada. En base a estadís-
ticas de comercio exterior (2000–2004), se analiza si el comercio de estas 
economías han evolucionado dentro de cadenas globales de producción y 
cuán grande este tipo de comercio es a efectos de mantener su presencia en 
la economía mundial. Siguiendo un patrón de comercio Norte-Sur, Gua-
temala y Nicaragua mantienen una moderada participación en una cadena 
global de producción. Sin embargo, su participación está amenazada 
por la competencia internacional y por su dependencia en un solo merca-
do. Brasil ha logrado participación en varias cadenas de producción, 
mostrando un patrón de comercio Norte-Sur más diversiÞ cado. Argentina 
ha logrado inserción en la cadena de producción automotriz mientras que 
su participación en otras cadenas es aún limitada. Su patrón de comercio 
Sur-Sur lo expone a un cierto grado de dependencia.
Palabras clave: Producción compartida, segmentación, comercio de partes y 
componentes, tercerización.
Código JEL:  F10, F23, L23. 
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A productive structure in which manufacturing or services activities 
developed at home are combined with those performed abroad, usually in 
more than one place, has been broadly named “International Fragmentation”. 
An example can be provided by the textile and apparel industries in advanced 
countries which have shifted their unskilled labor processes towards devel-
oping countries, keeping design and distribution at headquarters. Further 
examples can be found in high-technology sectors such as electronics, 
pharmaceutics and automobiles.
Nonetheless, there is not a standard denomination in the literature for 
this phenomenon. Sanyal & Jones (1982) have called as middle products the 
pair of inputs entailed for the production of Þ nal goods - those available in 
the national markets and those obtained abroad. Yeats (2001) and Kimura & 
Ando (2005) used production sharing to refer to the internationalization of 
a manufacturing process in which several countries participate at differ-
ent stages of the manufacturing process of a speciÞ c good. Likewise, terms 
such as super-specialization, vertical integration and outsourcing constitute 
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other examples by which it has been denominated in the literature (see Arndt, 
1998; Hummels et al., 2001; Feenstra et al., 1998).  
The expansion of international fragmentation of production along 
with globalization has gained substantial attention since the last decade. 
It has led to a body of research aimed at finding the causes, content and 
effects of production fragmentation. By investigating the forces that might 
have underpinned its expansion, Athukorala & Yamashita (2006) pointed 
out that the advances in production technology, innovations in transports 
and communications and the liberalization and trade reforms undertaken by 
many countries can be considered as the three main facts which have 
lowered service-linked costs and created new opportunities for extending 
product fragmentation across national frontiers. 
Likewise, a number of researchers have studied several aspects 
involved in the process. Jones & Kierzkowski (2005) took into account the 
geographical dimension. They emphasized the role of transport costs and 
service linkages and their contribution to international outsourcing, as 
compared to production within the borders of a single economy. Van Long et 
al. (2005) explored the role that services might play in limiting fragmentation. 
In their study, they pointed out that to produce components (fragmentation) 
and connect them with other production blocs, an economy needs both manu-
facturing labor and services. As the number of services an economy can offer 
depends on its size and stage of development, it can be argued that the greater 
the range of services an economy has, the more efÞ cient its production of 
components is. Nonetheless, in a country with a greater range of services 
they may be more expensive, perhaps due to higher labor cost. Therefore, 
the trade-off between scope in the supply of services and their individual 
cost determines what types of components will be produced in which 
country. Grossman & Helpman (2002) explored outsourcing decisions in a 
global economy framework. According to their model, such decisions are 
linked to three main features of the modern outsourcing strategy: (a) search-
ing for partners, (b) convincing potential suppliers to customize products 
in accordance with the needs and (c) relationship-speciÞ c investment, gov-
erned by incomplete contracts. Thus, the extent of international outsourcing 
will depend on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input 
suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each market, the relative cost of 
customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each 
country.
F * "*'& C- &.%'($, /!'$+ #' M%01+#$: I(#+*( #%'( ! P*'02/#%'( S- *%(1... 103
Several studies have emphasized that the phenomenon raises impli-
cations which are relevant from a policy point of view.  The existence of 
differences in factor prices across national borders is one of the main forces 
on a Þ rm’s outsourcing decision. Thus, as Þ rms in developed countries tend 
to shift their unskilled-labor stages of production towards developing coun-
tries abundant in this factor, fragmentation may drive changes in the pattern 
of trade, by enhancing integration of these very developing countries 
into the world economy. A number of works have addressed the effects 
that fragmentation might have on the wages of unskilled workers in devel-
oped countries. Feenstra (1998) has pointed out that domestic employment 
is affected when Þ rms decide to source their production overseas. Moreover, 
it will impact differentially the wages of unskilled and skilled workers. 
As unskilled labor in a developed country is relatively more expensive than 
abroad, the outsourced activities will be those that use a large amount of un-
skilled labor and, consequently, this will shift down the demand of unskilled 
relative to skilled labor within an industry. Yet, trade (through international 
fragmentation) and technology are complementary rather than competing ex-
planations for the change in employment and wages. Yomogida (2006) stud-
ied the effect of fragmentation on welfare for the case of developed coun-
tries. He argued that though a Þ rm might beneÞ t when it decides to move its 
production overseas, the Þ rm’s private decision not necessarily beneÞ ts the 
economy as a whole.   
In a sense, all these implications underline the key role that sharing 
production has for the development of those economies not yet participating 
in it. Actually, to get involved in any world fragmented chain of production 
represents a great challenge for any country and even more for those small 
developing economies whose opportunities are more limited. The lack of 
insertion in sharing production processes reduces their growth and industri-
alization opportunities, whilst their inclusion will provide more sustainable 
growth paths. Measuring the relative importance that sharing production has 
for any developing country constitutes a relevant issue, since it will provide 
some useful insights for policy design.
This study assesses the importance of shared world production for 
four Latin American economies: Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and Nicara-
gua, using trade data from 2000 to 2004. All experienced trade liberalization 
reforms and engaged in different regional trade agreements during the last 
few decades. Nevertheless, each has developed different trade structures. 
Size and specialization also varies considerably among them. Assessing their 
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insertion into international production sharing schemes leads us to inquire 
how and to which extent are they actually involved in sharing production? 
Other relevant questions are: How great is their participation in international 
production-sharing activities? Do parts and components hold representative 
shares on exports and imports as well?  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the empirical studies aimed at measuring fragmentation, followed by a 
short description of the methodological strategy. Section 3 gives a brief back-
ground of each Latin American economy. The core of the paper is Section 4, 
which discusses the empirical evidence and provides some perspectives and 
policy remarks. Section 5 concludes, taking into account the perspectives for 
those economies remaining outside international fragmentation.
II. M %*1!+$3 F!%3" $(%(+,$
 
Empirical literature focusing on measuring fragmentation is still quite 
limited. Most of the available studies based their analysis on trade in interme-
diate inputs. Feenstra (1998) investigated fragmentation developments with 
special attention to the US. In doing so, the author used three methods to 
measure the relative importance of fragmentation. The Þ rst approach requires 
a reclassiÞ cation of the trade data using the “end-use” categories of the Broad 
Economic Activities (BEA). As these categories assign goods according to 
their use by purchasers rather than by their production process, this reclassiÞ -
cation enables to determine the bulk of trade that occur through industries and 
activities linked to fragmentation as well as to analyze its evolution through 
time. A second method quantiÞ es imports of intermediate inputs within each 
industry. Input purchases data can be used to estimate imported intermediate 
inputs by industry.1 These estimated values can then be expressed relative to 
total intermediate inputs purchases. The third approach refers to the vertical 
specialization index proposed by Hummels et al. (1997), which is equal to 
the fraction of the total trade accounted by inputs that are both imported and 
then embodied in exports. By using all these measures, the author found that 
OECD countries had witnessed an increasing use of imported inputs as well 
as a reduction of domestic production activities. 
Jones et al. (2005) added empirical evidence on the rapid expan-
sion of international trade in parts and components. According to the au-
1. It can be computed by multiplying the purchases of each type of input and its respective share in 
the economy. The obtained values are then aggregated by each industry.
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thors, fragmentation does not depend on a particular market structure as 
its expansion occurs within a perfect competition structure as well as in a 
monopolistic one. The optimal degree of fragmentation depends on the size 
of the market and lowering service-linked costs promotes fragmentation. 
Under these considerations, the authors estimated an equation in which trade 
in parts and components of a particular region is explained by the size of the 
market, measured by the GDP, and service costs. The latter is measured by 
the average of business telephone charges. Their results depict indeed that 
international outsourcing has become a key feature of globalization, with the 
increase of trade in parts and components having surpassed the expansion of 
intra-industry trade.
In the context of the Asian economies, Lemoine & Unal-Kesenci 
(2004) explored the assembly trade developments of China by reclassifying 
China’s trade data by stage of production. As country’s exports may have 
high(low) imports content, the authors  measured China’s revealed compar-
ative advantages using the Contribution Trade Balance index (Lafay, 1994). 
The authors found that China’s international trade is enormously linked to 
world fragmented production processes. China’s specialization in assembly 
trade has enhanced the growth of its competitive manufacturing sector, 
which constituted the main channel for technology transfers. 
Kimura & Ando (2005) used finer disaggregated trade data and 
micro-data of Japanese Þ rms to investigate the international production (dis-
tribution) networks in East-Asia. Their study focuses on three main aspects: 
(a) the relative importance of trade in machinery goods and parts and compo-
nents; (b) the characteristics of the Japanese Þ rms and (c) the corporate Þ rm’s 
behavior from the viewpoint of Þ rms afÞ liated abroad. The latter is analyzed 
by computing the share sales/purchases of a number of Japanese afÞ liates in 
East Asia. Their results reveal that geographic distance and uncontrollability 
are the two axes of fragmentation in East Asia. Moreover, in both axes, service 
linkages seem to be the key in the development of production networks. 
Based on the decomposition-type threshold method proposed by 
Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997), Ando (2006) examined developments in 
the East Asian trade structure. This method –which is an extension of an 
earlier threshold method (Ab-el-Rahman, 1991)3 splits total trade up into 
three categories, namely, one-way, vertical intra-industry and horizontal 
intra-industry trade. The author found that the relative importance of vertical 
intra-industry trade has greatly increased, whilst  that of one-way trade has 
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drastically shrank reß ecting the fact that production sharing has become an 
essential feature of the East Asian economies. Following Yeats (2001) and 
Athukorala (2003), Athukorala & Yamashita (2006) also analyzed the 
nature, trends and patterns on fragmentation trade with special attention to 
East Asian economies. Their study comprises more recent and detailed UN 
trade data. Apart from evidencing a substantial expansion of fragmentation, 
they found that the degree of dependence on sharing production is propor-
tionately larger in East Asia than in North America and Europe.  
A common characteristic of the above studies is that they have focused 
on developed countries or East-Asian developing countries, giving little 
attention to Latin American economies.2 This might be explained by the fact 
that most statistical systems fail in compiling trade under a value-chain 
perspective. In fact, measuring fragmentation entails Þ ner trade data, and a 
number of the empirical studies previously mentioned have used not only 
standard international trade statistics but complementary trade data not gener-
ally available for developing countries. Görg (2000) used data from the Out-
ward Processing Trade in EU and Feenstra et al. (1998) used the US Off-
shore Assembly Program data to capture trade under custom arrangements 
in which complete/partial tariff exception or levy reductions are granted in 
accordance to the domestic input content of imported goods. Yeats (2001) 
used both international trade statistics - SITC 7 revision 3- and the Offshore 
Assembly Processing (OAP) data to assess the magnitude and nature of 
global production sharing. 
In spite of the limitations imposed by the lack of complementary 
trade statistics, we succeeded in assessing fragmentation for four Latin 
American economies. To accomplish this, we followed Yeats (2001)’s 
methodology, which can be applied to the available trade data. With the help 
of OAP data, Yeats (2001) compared trade in parts and components with 
that in Þ nal products, in order to assess the magnitude of global production 
sharing. In the absence of OAP-like information, we focus not only on parts 
and components comprised under the SITC-7 rev.3 group, but also on those 
SITC product groups classiÞ ed as semi-Þ nished products that are used as 
inputs in fragmented production of manufactures. Using a revised version of 
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC), we reclassiÞ ed SITC products into 
categories corresponding to their intermediate or final use. Moreover, 
in order to identify the stage of production that any SITC products is related 
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2. Fontagné et al. (1999) addressed fragmentation in the automotive and  electronics sectors in Asia 
and Latin America.
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with, we also classiÞ ed them by stage of production, following the classiÞ ca-
tion proposed by Lemoine & Unal-Kesenci (2004).3 Three stages of pro-
duction were considered: (a) primary goods (I); (b) intermediate goods, split 
up into two categories: semi-Þ nished products (II) and parts and components 
(III); (c) Þ nal goods which also split into two categories: capital goods (IV) 
and consumption goods (V).
We used COMTRADE statistics from 2000 to 2004, available up 
to Þ ve-digits of the SITC rev.3 classiÞ cation. Nevertheless, in the case of 
Guatemala and Nicaragua, COMTRADE datasets do not include trade ß ows 
from special trade regimes. This unreported data is related to assembling 
trade and hence highly relevant for purposes of this paper. To deal with this 
issue, additional trade statistics disaggregated by trade regimes were gathered 
for the case of Guatemala. These were provided by the Bank of Guatemala 
(BANGUAT) but only from 2002 to 2004.4 Further comparison between both 
datasets showed that only trade made through Guatemala’s customs territory 
regime was reported by COMTRADE whilst trade effectuated through Free 
Trade Zone (FTZ) and the Decree 2989 (D2989) regimes were unreported. 
Moreover, the percentage of unreported data was relatively signiÞ cant. As 
Figure 1 shows, export from Guatemala’s customs territory held only 54% 
of total Guatemalan exports during 2002-2004, while exports from FTZ and 
D2989 regimes held 46% of total exports during the same period.
Figure 1
Guatemala. Unreported trade data
Data source: Authors’ estimations based on COMTRADE and the Bank of Guatemala databases
Also, it is worth mentioning that trade statistics from BANGUAT 
were available up to eight-digits of the Central American system nomen-
3. See Annex 1 for more details on the classiÞ cation adopted.
4.The Bank of Guatemala began to report trade statistics by each trade regimen (special trade regimes 
included) since 2002. Trade statistics before 2002 comprises only those exports and imports made 
through Guatemala’s customs territory.
  
Guatemala Exports 2002-2004 Guatemala Imports 2002-2004 
Custom 
Zone; 64%
FTZ+D2989
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5. It was not possible to deÞ ne the percentage of unreported data for the case of Nicaragua. Up to 
our knowledge detailed trade statistics by free trade zone regime are recorded since 2002 by the 
National Commission of Free Zones (CNZF) and by the Dirección General de Aduanas (DGA), 
but only general statistics are available.
6. Openness is deÞ ned as the ratio of export plus imports of goods and services divided by the GDP
7. Brazil's diverse industries range from automobiles, steel and petrochemicals to computers, aircraft, 
and consumer durables trade.
clature (SAC, Spanish acronym). This classiÞ cation system is based on the 
Harmonized Commodity description and coding system of 2002 (HS-2002). 
More speciÞ cally, the Þ rst six-digits of the SAC classiÞ cation correspond 
exactly to the HS-2002 codes. Accordingly, the BANGUAT dataset has then 
been reclassiÞ ed into the SITC rev.3 codes, using a correspondence table 
between HS-2002 and SITC rev.3 classiÞ cations.
For Nicaragua, the analysis is based only on COMTRADE, since we 
could not gather similar detailed statistics, despite the efforts made.5
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Brazil and Argentina are the biggest members of M+*/'$2*. Both 
countries underwent liberalization programs during the late eighties, initially 
on a unilateral basis. Subsequently, they decided to intensify their liberal-
ization reforms through a bilateral agreement. Later on, Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay decided to Þ rm the Treaty of Asunción, creating the 
Southern Common Market (M+*/'$2*). 
Brazilian trade reforms led the country to expand gradually its interna-
tional trade. According to the World Trade Organization, WTO (2004), Brazil 
–characterized by having a large and well developed agricultural, mining and 
services sectors - is expanding its presence in world markets. During 2000-
2003, it attained the highest degree of openness in its post-war history. The 
average openness6 ratio has risen from 18.1% during 1996-1999 to 27.3% 
during 2000-2003.  The WTO also highlights that Brazil has diversiÞ ed its 
trade partnership to regions hitherto with a rather small share in its trade 
ß ows.  Moreover, the country has continued reinforcing its trade liberalization 
policies, independently as well as a M+*/'$2* member. 
Brazilian trade policy has focused on strengthening the expansion 
of trade in industrial goods.7 Automobiles, aircrafts and shipbuilding have 
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beneÞ ted from speciÞ c support programs. Moreover, Brazil has become a 
world-class manufacturer of selected products, like motor vehicles, aircraft, 
and certain electronic products and machinery and equipment.
Argentina experienced an economic boom during the nineties, with 
signiÞ cant GDP growth rates, control of the inß ation rate and broad market 
reforms, including liberalization, deregulation and privatization. Neverthe-
less, by the end of the decade, several external and internal crises drastically 
affected the country. Recession began to unfold, with GDP experiencing a 
fall. By the end of 2001, the economic recession turned into a severe Þ nancial 
crisis. To alleviate the impact of the crisis, the government pursued extreme 
policy measures. All bank deposits were frozen; the country defaulted on 
external debt and repealed the convertibility of the national currency and 
devaluating it. With a more competitive and ß exible exchange rate, new 
policies based on re-industrialization, the increase of exports, and consistent 
Þ scal and trade surpluses were implemented. By the end of 2002, the econo-
my began gradually to recover. GDP grew by a sustainable annual rate of 9% 
during 2003 and 2004. At the same time, exports and imports also increased 
signiÞ cantly. 
Guatemala and Nicaragua are former members of the Central Amer-
ican Common Market (CACM). Guatemala is both the largest country and 
economy of Central America, with a population of 12.29 m and a GDP of US$ 
27.39 bn in 2004. Nicaragua, with a GDP of US$ 4.49 bn and a population of 
5.49 m in 2004, is, after Haiti, the second poorest economy in the region. The 
two countries underwent years of severe political issues, which ended only 
during the last decade.8 Since then, both have undertaken important steps to 
enhance growth, as well as their insertion into the world economy.     
Guatemala’s economy is based mainly on agriculture9; the main eco-
nomic sector in terms of output, employment and trade.  In 2005, it accounted 
for about 22% of GDP. Manufacturing accounted for 12.4% 200510, down 
from 13.2% in 2000, evidencing that even though its value-added in real 
terms has increased, the relative share of this sector in total GDP has steadily 
decreased during the current decade. Yet, processed agricultural products for 
8. Guatemala suffered more than 36 years of internal conß icts which formally ended with the signature 
of the Peace Accord at the end of 1996. On the other hand, Nicaragua endured a Sandinista Regi-
men for 12 years which ended at the beginning of the nineties with the defeat of the Sandinistas 
by a coalition of Anti Sandinistas.
9. It also includes forestry, Þ shing and hunting activities.
10. Based on statistics from the Bank of Guatemala. 
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domestic and overseas markets represent the main output of Guatemalan 
industry. In a minor scale, export-oriented products such as textiles, footwear 
and chemicals constitute other representative industries within the manufac-
turing sector. 
The Guatemalan administration has encouraged the growth of export- 
oriented industries during the last few years. In this regard, Guatemalan trade 
policy sought to promote a competitive market, where producers are posi-
tioned according to their productivity, as well as strategies to intensify its in-
ternational insertion. The Maquila law (D 29-89)11 and the Free Trade Zones 
Law12 are among the key trade measures undertaken by the government. 
Trade of intermediate goods, machinery and parts and components greatly 
beneÞ ted from them. Information provided by the Ministry of Econo-
my indicates that, in November 2005, there were 554 active Þ rms beneÞ ting 
from the assembly law and another 185 Þ rms operating in free trade zones. 
Of these, 324 were engaged in the production of clothes and apparel, and 129 
in manufactured products. Other important activities included the production 
of plastics, pharmaceutics and chemicals as well as the commercialization of 
agricultural products.
Nicaragua is also characterized by being an agricultural economy 
with a small manufacturing base. Around 36% of the land area is devoted 
to agriculture and livestock, and manufacturing accounts for around 18% 
of GDP. The WTO highlights in its report on Nicaragua that a large part 
of the manufacturing sector is composed of industries which produce food-
stuff and beverages, mainly made from meat, milk and sugar. Furniture and 
footwear are also representative within the manufacturing sector. In 2002, 
they accounted for 413 and 212 Þ rms, respectively. Yet, textiles and wearing 
apparel constitutes a dynamic growing sector. The enlargement of this sector 
- which uses unskilled labor and low technology – has been enhanced by the 
Free Trade Zones regime, the preferential treatment (zero duties) granted, in 
the framework of CAFTA, for some textiles and wearing apparel in the US 
market and also the comparatively low labor cost the country enjoys in the 
region. The automotive industry is still rather small, with only 80 of 3467 
Þ rms in 2002 producing parts and components for vehicles, with a value- 
added of 0.6 %. 
11. The main purpose of the Maquila law (Decree 29-89) was to promote and develop the Maquila 
and exporting activities in Guatemala. Likewise, The Free Trade Zones (Decree 65-89) aimed at 
promoting exports and foreign and domestic investments as well as employment and technology 
transfer.
 12. Central American Free Trade Agreement.
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We start by inspecting the composition of each country’s trade structure, 
identifying which stage of production their trade ß ows are associated with. 
There are two reasons for doing this. First, a country might be involved in 
a stage of the production process that uses more intensively semi-Þ nished 
goods rather than parts and components. Second, the SITC-7 category in-
cludes mostly parts and components for machinery and transport industries; 
nevertheless, industries such as chemicals, apparel and textiles, footwear 
and so forth require also semi-Þ nished products not comprised under the 
SITCT-7 category. Table 1 depicts the composition of trade by broad groups 
of products and stage of production.   
As regards Argentina, except for 2004, intermediate products consti-
tute by far the foremost category in both exports and imports (70% of total 
exports and 64% of total imports, in 2003), with semi-Þ nished products 
being the most representative sub-group. The share of parts and components 
oscillates around 6% of total exports, whilst its relative participation in total 
imports has decreased. For Þ nal goods, those for consumption (sub-group 
V) have fairly increased their relative participation in exports, while within 
total imports it has greatly decreased. The substantial signiÞ cance of both 
intermediate and Þ nal goods in the Argentine trade structure suggests that its 
manufacturing sector is linked to fragmented chains of production, a point to 
be further checked.  
Intermediates also represent the most important category in the 
Brazilian trade structure. On the export side, their relative importance has 
slightly decreased (from 61% in 2000 to 58% 2004); on the import side, an 
increasing participation is noticeable (from 65% in 2000 to 70% in 2004). 
Although exports in parts and components make around 12% of total 
exports, semi-Þ nished products remain the most important sub-group within 
this category. Consumption goods (sub-group V) are the most representative 
subgroup within exports of final goods. A comparison between exports 
shares of Argentina and Brazil indicates that capital goods (sub-group IV) 
hold a relatively greater participation in Brazil, suggesting that the Brazil-
ian manufacturing sector would be more connected to high-tech production 
chains than Argentina. 
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Nicaragua’s trade structure is dominated by Þ nal goods, with consump-
tion goods holding the most relevant shares in both exports and imports. 
However, the relative participation of semi-Þ nished goods in imports is 
noticeable, whilst parts and components hold a relatively small share. On the 
exports side, the participation of primary goods has enormously increased 
-from 14% in 2000 to 32% in 2004-, indicating that the country maintains 
yet a high dependence on trade in traditional goods. Exports in parts and 
components are negligible; suggesting how poorly linked is the manufacturing 
sector to high-tech production chains, though perhaps highly connected to 
low-tech ones.
Guatemala’s trade composition is a bit similar to Nicaragua’s. The 
high relative participation of semi-Þ nished goods in Nicaragua’s imports 
along with the high share of Þ nal goods in its exports indicates the country is 
also connected to low-tech production chains. Guatemalan imports are most-
ly concentrated on intermediate goods, with semi-Þ nished products taking 
an overwhelming share of 53% in 2004. The bulk of these imports enter 
the country through the two special customs regimes already mentioned, the 
free trade zone and Decree 2989, beneÞ ting export-oriented industries. On 
the export side, Þ nal goods have the highest participation, mainly delivered 
through special customs zones. Contrary to Nicaragua, exports in primary 
goods show a decreasing participation, which evidences not only a substan-
tial change in Guatemala’s trade pattern, but also a major dynamism of its 
manufacturing sector.
We now examine in more detail, the direction of trade in parts and 
components by regional blocs. By doing this, we can shed some light on 
whether the beneÞ ts/barriers imposed by partners have inß uenced the devel-
opment of the trade patterns.
 
IV.1. The South American economies
Figure 2 shows the direction of trade in parts and components, for Ar-
gentina. A South-South trade pattern emerges, thanks to the large amount of 
trade with M+*/'$2*, by far Argentina’s leading partner in either imports or 
exports in parts and components. As Table 2a shows, the share of M+*/'$2* 
in total Argentina’s imports in parts and components increased steadily from 
22% in 2000 to 27% in 2004. By contrast, the share of M+*/'$2* in total 
Argentina’s exports in parts and components decreased from 56% in 2000 to 
44% in 2003, recovering in 2004 to 50%. Inside the bloc, Brazil stands as Ar-
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gentina’s major partner, which is not surprising as both countries have strong 
intra-industry linkages especially in the automotive sector. 
Figure 2
Argentina, 2004: Direction of trade in parts and components
by regional blocs
Source: Authors’ estimations based on COMTRADE data. 
Though the share of the European Union (EU) in Argentina’s imports 
shows a decreasing path, it represents yet an important supplier of parts and 
components to Argentina. The EU accounted for 24% of total Argentine im-
ports in parts and components in 2004, down from 31% in 2000. Exports to 
the EU slightly increased from 14% in 2000 to 16% in 2004. Inside the EU, 
Germany and Spain display the most representative shares in both imports 
and exports of 200413 (respectively, 7.8% and 4.1%, imports, and 4.9% and 
5.6%, exports).   
NAFTA represents the third supplier of parts and components, with 
17% of total respective imports in 2004 (decreasing from 23 % in 2000). This 
lower Þ gure is mainly explained by the fall of the US share, which recorded 
only 13.8% of total Argentina’s imports in part and components in 2004, in 
sharp contrast with the 18.5% recorded in 2000. Likewise, Mexico shrank 
slightly its share from 2.2% in 2000 to 1.9% in 2004. On the export side, 
NAFTA kept a steady share of over 20% during the whole period, though 
Mexico decreased from 9.4% in 2000 to 6.8% in 2004.  
EU OTHER EAST 
ASIAN
USA
ARGENTINA
CHINA
24%
Exports P&C
6%
Exports P&C
6%
Exports P&C
27%
Exports P&C
50 %
Exp.,Re-exp. P&C 17% Exp.,Re-
exp. P&C
16%
Exp, Re-exp
P&C
JAPAN 
7%
Exports P&C
21% Exports
P&C
MERCOSUR 
13. Due to space considerations, tables containing indicators by major country partners are not pro-
vided here. However,  these tables  are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 2a
Argentinian trade in parts and components, by economic blocs
Source: Authors' calculations based on COMTRADE databases
a/ From 2000 to 2003 "EU" includes EU-15 members. For 2004 It also considers the new member states 
of: Cyprus, Estonia Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
b/ "Other east Asian" includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN4: Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia), and Newly Industrializing Economies 4 (NIEs4: Taiwan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore).  
*/ Share of total country's exports (imports) in parts and components
 Blocs 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
E
x
p
o
rt
s 
in
 P
 &
 C
(v
a
lu
e 
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
$
 )
JAPAN 439 5136 4543 1642 1795
CAN 21140 26137 22446 20400 43737
CHINA 8613 1340 1993 4143 11539
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 13615 34076 18738 1564 1623
EU a/ 139885 146576 159785 177265 196349
MCCA 1862 1860 1993 2424 2844
MERCOSUR 581289 446576 389141 395307 597791
NAFTA 210948 182725 199586 225816 258099
ROW 60109 58416 59196 73732 90115
S
h
a
re
 %
JAPAN 0 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1
CAN 2 2.9 2.6 2.3 3.6
CHINA 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 1.3 3.8 2.2 0.2 0.1
EU a/ 13.5 16.2 18.6 19.6 16.3
MCCA 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
MERCOSUR 56 49.5 45.4 43.8 49.7
NAFTA 20.3 20.2 23.3 25 21.4
ROW 5.8 6.5 6.9 8.2 7.5
Im
p
o
rt
s 
in
 P
 &
 C
(v
a
lu
e 
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
$
 )
JAPAN 239847 275982 103624 142428 223500
CAN 1979 2466 942 1824 3491
CHINA 101738 125118 31343 105145 195259
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 276264 238675 46550 98321 184864
EU a/ 1138325 746433 378711 472927 784036
CACM 1356 3963 831 4523 14465
MERCOSUR 805141 690767 330962 493301 838596
NAFTA 783957 650705 273830 351819 522881
ROW 301743 225781 124746 174105 344393
Grand Total 3650350 2959890 1291539 1844392 3111485
S
h
a
re
 %
JAPAN 6.6 9.3 8 7.7 7.2
CAN 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
CHINA 2.8 4.2 2.4 5.7 6.3
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 7.6 8.1 3.6 5.3 5.9
EU a/ 31.2 25.2 29.3 25.6 25.2
CACM 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
MERCOSUR 22.1 23.3 25.6 26.7 27
NAFTA 21.5 22 21.2 19.1 16.8
ROW 8.3 7.6 9.7 9.4 11.1
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Table 2b
Brazilian trade in parts and components, by economic blocs
 Blocs 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
E
x
p
o
rt
s 
in
 P
 &
 C
(v
a
lu
e 
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
$
 )
JAPAN 439 5136 4543 1642 1795
CAN 21140 26137 22446 20400 43737
CHINA 8613 1340 1993 4143 11539
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 13615 34076 18738 1564 1623
EU a/ 139885 146576 159785 177265 196349
MCCA 1862 1860 1993 2424 2844
MERCOSUR 581289 446576 389141 395307 597791
NAFTA 210948 182725 199586 225816 258099
ROW 60109 58416 59196 73732 90115
S
h
a
re
 %
JAPAN 0 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1
CAN 2 2.9 2.6 2.3 3.6
CHINA 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 1.3 3.8 2.2 0.2 0.1
EU a/ 13.5 16.2 18.6 19.6 16.3
MCCA 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
MERCOSUR 56 49.5 45.4 43.8 49.7
NAFTA 20.3 20.2 23.3 25 21.4
ROW 5.8 6.5 6.9 8.2 7.5
Im
p
o
rt
s 
in
 P
 &
 C
(v
a
lu
e 
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
$
 )
JAPAN 239847 275982 103624 142428 223500
CAN 1979 2466 942 1824 3491
CHINA 101738 125118 31343 105145 195259
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 276264 238675 46550 98321 184864
EU a/ 1138325 746433 378711 472927 784036
CACM 1356 3963 831 4523 14465
MERCOSUR 805141 690767 330962 493301 838596
NAFTA 783957 650705 273830 351819 522881
ROW 301743 225781 124746 174105 344393
Grand Total 3650350 2959890 1291539 1844392 3111485
S
h
a
re
 %
JAPAN 6.6 9.3 8 7.7 7.2
CAN 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
CHINA 2.8 4.2 2.4 5.7 6.3
OTHER EAST ASIANb/ 7.6 8.1 3.6 5.3 5.9
EU a/ 31.2 25.2 29.3 25.6 25.2
CACM 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
MERCOSUR 22.1 23.3 25.6 26.7 27
NAFTA 21.5 22 21.2 19.1 16.8
ROW 8.3 7.6 9.7 9.4 11.1
Source: Authors' calculations based on COMTRADE databases
a/ From 2000 to 2003 "EU" includes EU-15 members. For 2004 It also considers the new member states 
of: Cyprus, Estonia Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
b/ "Other east Asian" includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN4: Indonesia, the Phili-
ppines, Thailand and Malaysia), and Newly Industrializing Economies 4 (NIEs4: Taiwan, Korea, Hong 
Kong and Singapore).  
*/ Share of total country's exports (imports) in parts and components
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The share of the “other East Asian” bloc in total imports also de-
creased from 8% in 2000 to 6% in 2004. The huge increase in imports from 
China (a two-fold increase in import value, from US$ 101 m to US$ 195 m, 
resulting in an increase in market share from 2.8% in 2000 to 6.3% in 2004) 
is particularly noteworthy. Japan instead showed a tiny increase from 6.6% 
in 2000 to 7.2% in 2004. Moreover, “other East Asian” bloc shares in total 
Argentine exports in parts and components fell from 1.3% in 2000 to 0.13% 
in 2004. 
While the Argentinian’s trade in parts and components depicted a 
pro-South-South pattern, the Brazilian trade followed a more North-South 
pattern. As Table 2 shows the EU has become Brazil’s leading supplier, 
holding around 30% of its total imports in parts and components by the end 
of 2004. In decreasing order, Germany, Spain, France and Italy are the main 
suppliers within this bloc. However, Germany, Spain and Italy decreased 
slightly their shares from 10%, 3.4%, 4.5% in 2000 to 9%, 2.8% and 4.5% 
in 2004, respectively. France instead increased its share from 3.5% in 2000 
to 5.5% in 2004.  
NAFTA, the second supplier, decreased substantially its share from 
36% in 2000 to 25% in 2004. Inside this bloc, only the US is ranked among 
the top ten major country partners of Brazilian imports in parts and compo-
nents. Though it held a quite signiÞ cant share into the Brazilian market, it 
declined from 33.4% in 2000 to 22.5% in 2004. This can be explained by the 
expansion of China, whose penetration in the Brazilian market has rapidly 
increased.
Imports from Asia are also noteworthy. The “other East Asian” bloc 
increased from 13% in 2000 to 19% in 2004. Imports from Korea and Taiwan 
were the most representative within this bloc. Both economies held increas-
ing shares from 4.3% and 2.5% in 2000, to 7.4% and 3.4% in 2004, respec-
tively. China has substantially increased its share from 3% in 2000 to 8% in 
to 2004. 
Brazil has indeed diversiÞ ed its export markets in parts and compo-
nents. While in terms of value, exports to NAFTA slightly increased from 
US$ 2.0 b in 2000 to US$ 2.7 b in 2004, the relative importance of NAFTA 
declined from 45% in 2000 to 41% in 2004. This fall is mainly explained by 
a decreasing participation of the USA market, whose share shrank from 35% 
in 2000 to 31% in 2004.  
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In contrast, the relative importance of the EU into the Brazilian ex-
ports in parts and components rose signiÞ cantly from 17% in 2000 to 23% in 
2004.  Three of the four main EU-partners of Brazil increased substantially 
their share (Germany, France and United Kingdom, from 5.8%; 1.4%; 1.9% 
in 2000, to 7.5%, 2%; 5% in 2004, respectively). 
The share of M+*/'$2* fell down from 20% in 2000, to 14% in 
2004, due to the signiÞ cant fall of Argentina’s share in the Brazilian exports 
from 18% in 2000 to 13% in 2004. This helped to re-orient the direction 
of the Brazilian trade in parts and components towards a more North-South 
pattern.
As regards the Asian blocs, the increase of China’s share in the Bra-
zilian exports, from 0.6% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2004, is noteworthy. By contra-
ry, those of Japan and other East Asian bloc are really small and decreasing. 
This is not unexpected since Brazil represents one of the main locations in 
which Japanese manufacturing Þ rms develop their activities in Latin Ameri-
can, particularly in the machinery manufacturing industry. 
IV.2. The Central American economies
NAFTA represents by far the foremost market from which Guate-
mala supplies its modest requirements of parts and components. As Table 
3 shows, these imports enter the country either by using the common tariff 
system or the special trade regimes. The US is the leading country partner 
inside this bloc. However its share went down from 49% in 2000 to 33% 
in 2004.  
Although the shares of the EU, M+*/'$2* and other East Asian are 
less signiÞ cant, they increased from 16%; 4%; 8% in 2000, to 17%; 8%; 11% 
in 2004, respectively. China and Japan instead decreased their shares from 
3.5%; 3.6% in 2000 to 1%; 3% in 2004 respectively.
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As regards to Nicaragua, a number of Þ rms -providers of important 
multinationals from the automotive industry- have recently moved their 
operations of light assembly manufacturing to Nicaragua. Though the sec-
tor is not well developed yet; it has led to a faint increase of the Nicaraguan 
trade in parts and components. As Table 3 shows, Nicaraguan imports in 
parts and components come primarily from NAFTA, in which the US stays 
as the top leading country partner, though its relative importance decrea-
sed substantially from 46% in 2000 to 34% in 2004. By contrary, the EU, 
M+*/'$2* and the Asian Region increased their relative importance into 
the Nicaraguan market.
The small relative importance of parts and components in the im-
port structures of Guatemala and Nicaragua is not surprising as both coun-
tries have a small manufacturing industry. Moreover, their signiÞ cance is 
basically limited to the import structures. In this regard, we do not analyze 
further the direction of exports in parts and components for these econo-
mies. However, considering that semi-Þ nished products hold quite signiÞ -
cant shares in their trade structures; it is convenient - for these countries in 
particular - to explore the direction of their trade in semi-Þ nished products 
by regional blocs.
 
Figures in Table 4 depict that the composition of Guatemalan im-
ports in semi-Þ nished goods did not change much during 2002-2004. Near-
ly half of the Guatemalan imports are shipped from NAFTA, with the US 
taking an overwhelming share of 40%.  Yet, only 17% of these imports 
from NAFTA are done through the special trade regimes in which the US 
still take an overwhelming share of 16%. These Þ gures highlight the huge 
dependence of Guatemala on the US market. 
Other East Asian ranks as the second semi-Þ nished products suppli-
er, holding more than 16% of the Guatemalan market. These imports are 
mostly done through special trade regimes, as several Asian companies, 
particularly apparel-companies from Korea, delocalized their labor-inten-
sive production activities to this country.  The share of CACM (8%) into 
the Guatemalan imports of semi-Þ nished goods is also noteworthy. El Sal-
vador, Costa Rica and Honduras represent at intra-regional level, the main 
Guatemala’s trade partners.
Guatemalan exports in semi-Þ nished products to CACM as well as 
to Other East Asia depicted signiÞ cant changes whilst those to NAFTA 
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and other blocs did not depict signiÞ cant variations (see Table 4). In 2004, 
exports to CACM surpassed more than two-fold the export-value reached in 
2002 (from 253 to US$ 516 m dollars) which led to increase its share from 
37% in 2002 to 53% in 2004. At the country level, Guatemalan exports to 
CACM member states increased signiÞ cantly during this period. Exports to 
Korea decreased from 85.3 m in 2002 to US$ 33.8 m dollars. As a result, 
the share of other East Asian decreased notably from 15% in 2002 to 5% 
in 2004. 
As shown in Table 5, Nicaraguan imports in semi-Þ nished goods 
come basically from NAFTA, whose shares steadily increased from 29% in 
2000 to 33% in 2004. The US and Mexico are the most signiÞ cant partners 
(24% and 8% in 2004, respectively). These shares – and more in particular 
the one of US - might be much higher as our data does not include Nicaragua’s 
assembly trade which is mainly performed with the US market. Further-
more, as in the case of Guatemala, the export-oriented assembly sector has 
grown supported by national policies to promote FDI and exports in this 
sector, as well as by the special tariff-preference levels the country enjoys 
under CAFTA.14 The shares of CACM went accordingly down from 46% 
in 2000 to 37% in 2004. Costa Rica keeps the largest share in this bloc 
(18% in 2004), followed by Guatemala and El Salvador with 11% and 8% 
respectively for 2004.
The EU is the third most important supplier of semi-Þ nished prod-
ucts. It increased slightly its relative participation from 6% in 2000 to 7% 
in 2004.  In contrast, the “Other East Asian” bloc depicted a small partici-
pation (2% in 2000 and 3% in 2004). Taiwan and Korea stand as the main 
partners within this bloc.15 These low shares seem to be inconsistent with 
the level of activity that East Asian companies have in Nicaragua. In fact, 
aside from the American companies, a number of the operating factories in 
the apparel and textiles sector are owned by Taiwanese and Korean Þ rms. 
A possible explanation for this inconsistence could be  that as our datasets 
lack information of trade carried out through the free zone regime – the 
main system used by export-processing Þ rms in Nicaragua -, the effective 
trade developed by Nicaragua is underestimated. An alternative explana-
14. The tariff-preference level establishes that up to 100 million square meters equivalents (SME) of 
fabric coming from any part of the world may be used to assemble garments in Nicaragua, which 
will enjoy tariff-free access to the U.S. However this measure was granted for a limited period 
of time.
15. Evidently, the share of these countries in the Nicaraguan import structure of semi-Þ nished goods 
is also tiny (less than 1%) during the whole period.
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tion might be given by the fact that several East Asian factories operating 
in Nicaragua produce garments and textiles products for target American 
Þ rms. Thus, given the restrictions that US imposed to several East Asian 
countries (e.g., Taiwan) to place their products in this market it would be 
possible that  they might be sourcing themselves either directly (from their 
headquarters) or indirectly (through other Central American countries).  
On the export side, NAFTA and CACM represent the main markets 
for the Nicaraguan semi-Þ nished products, accounting jointly for over 90% 
of total exports in these goods (see Table 5). While the US market increa-
sed steadily its share into the Nicaragua’s exports in semi-Þ nished (from 
25% in 2000 to 41% in 2004), Canada, in contrast, reduced substantially 
its share from 27% in 2000 to 19% in 2004. Inside CACM, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Honduras constituted in decreasing importance the main 
destinations of Nicaragua’s exports in semi-Þ nished goods.
Contrary to the two South American economies, both Guatemala 
and Nicaragua depict a clear North-South trade pattern which is eviden-
ced by the fact that their trade in intermediate goods (semi-Þ nished pro-
ducts and parts and components) is highly concentrated in a unique market: 
NAFTA. This pattern has been enforced by the unilateral preferential terms 
granted by the US to these countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) and CAFTA.
IV.3. Analysis at the product level 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the relative importance of selected groups 
of parts and components in the Argentine and Brazilian trade ß ows from 
2000 to 2004. A key feature of this type of trade is that it is dominated by 
products related to the automotive industry, a leading manufacturing acti-
vity in these countries.
In the case of Argentina, as Table 6 shows, in 2004, the selected 
products constituted jointly 57% or about US$1.77 bn of total imports in 
parts and components and 84% or about $ 1.02 billion of total exports in 
these goods. The bulk of exports comprised into these groups increased in 
US$ 179.6 m since 2000, but imports decreased in US$ 108 m since the 
same year. Five of the twenty major imports are linked to the automotive 
industry, accounting for over 29% of total imports in parts and components, 
with parts and accessories for road vehicles (SITC 78439) alone accoun-
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ting for US$ 399 m, or about 13% of the total exchange in these goods. 
Gearboxes (SITC-78434) show a positive trade balance during the whole 
period, which is explained by the fact that during the last years the sector 
has attracted investments from leading multinational automakers, induced 
by the lower production costs and the growing domestic market.
Table 6 also shows that products linked to machinery and equipment 
are fairly signiÞ cant. Compression-ignition engines (SITC 71323) raised their 
imports share from 2.9% in 2000 to 5.7% in 2004, whereas they have reduced 
their exports shares from 10% in 2000 to 6% in 2004. Exports of parts inclu-
ded in SITC-71819 group accounted for only US$ 2.5 m of total exports in 
parts and components, decreasing its relative participation from 2% in 2000 to 
0.2% in 2004. However, this group still holds a positive trade balance.
Products related to the electrical machinery industry, as boards 
(SITC-77261), parts of electrical ignition (SITC 77833), electrical equi-
pment (SITC 77834) are also noteworthy. Taken together, these groups 
accounted for about 5% of total exports in parts and components.  OfÞ ce 
machines products are ranked also as major Argentine trade in parts and 
components, parts and accessories for calculating machines (SITC 75997) 
being the most representative group, with 7% of total imports in parts and 
components.
Though the relative importance of the selected products into the 
Argentinian trade in parts and components has risen, the one they hold in 
total trade has decreased. While the relative importance of these products 
on total exports of part and components passed from 81% in 2000 to 84% 
in 2004, their share in total Argentina’s exports show stagnation. Taken 
together the selected products share only 5% of total Argentina’s exports in 
2000 as well as in 2004.
In the case of Brazil, the major twenty groups represent 42% of total 
imports in parts and components in 2000 and about 75% of all exports of 
this kind in 2004 (see Table 7). Half of them record a positive trade balan-
ce, since Brazilian manufacturing not only develops assembly activities 
but also produces some high technology components. Six of the twenty 
major groups are related to the automotive industry, accounting for 14% of 
total imports in parts and components and about 32% of total exports. Parts 
and accessories for motor vehicles (SITC 78439) is the most representative 
one, having improved its trade balance through time. 
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Besides the automotive industry, machinery and equipment is also 
representative. Four of the twenty major groups are related to this sector 
(71322, 71323, 71391 and 71392). In 2004, they accounted jointly for over 
6% of imports and about 29% of exports, rising their relative participation 
from that  showed in 2000 (23%) only on the export side. Among these four 
groups, piston engines (71322) greatly raised its relative participation from 
over 4% in 2000 to about 8% in 2004. In decreasing importance, parts and 
components related to the electronics, telecommunications and aircrafts in-
dustries are also included among the major groups.  
Although in terms of value added, trade in parts and components 
has greatly increased, the relative importance of the major groups in total 
Brazilian exports has not increased signiÞ cantly. On the imports side, the-
se twenty groups raised their participation in total Brazilian imports from 
11% in 2000 to about 13% in 2004. On the exports side, they have slightly 
decreased their share into total Brazilian exports from 9% in 2000 to about 
8% in 2004.
Additional information about Argentinian and Brazilian trade in 
parts and components is provided when the value of exports is aggregated 
up to two-digit SITC groups of parts and components. Road motor vehicles 
(parts, sub-group 78) is by far the most important category. It accounts for 
over 55% of Argentina’s exports in parts and components, and for 33% in 
the case of Brazil. A second important category is machinery and equip-
ment which account for 18% of Argentina’s exports, but for 31% of the 
total Brazilian exports in parts and components in 2004. Electronics and 
telecommunications come then, in decreasing importance. In the case of 
Brazil, their relative participation has grown. In the case of Argentina, by 
contrast, electronics has decreased in importance, from 10% in 2000 to 
8% in 2004, whereas telecommunications kept a share of 3% during this 
period.  
The data indicates therefore that Brazil has consolidated its inser-
tion into diverse manufacturing chains of production; but it also has achie-
ved this within a diversiÞ ed North-South pattern. Argentina, instead, has 
attained a strong insertion into the automotive chain of production, whereas 
its insertion within other chains seems still reduced. Moreover, the country 
retains its insertion within a South-South scheme.
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As regards Guatemala, we analyzed the relative importance that 
semi-Þ nished products have in the trade ß ows. Table 8 depicts imports 
(2002-2004) of selected semi-Þ nished items by using special regimes pro-
ducts. Although the twenty selected products represent only 36% of total 
Guatemala’s imports in semi-Þ nished products, they also account jointly 
for over 13% of total imports through special regimes in 2004. Moreover, 
the data highlights that most of the selected groups are related to semi-Þ -
nished products used in the apparel and textile industries. In fact, in 2004, 
two-digit textiles (SITC 65) accounted for about 70% of total imports in 
semi-Þ nished products, followed by miscellaneous manufactured articles 
(SITC 89) with 4%, and paper articles (SITC 64) with 3.5%. Knitted or 
crocheted fabrics (SITC 65529) is the most representative, especially since 
it has experienced a notable growth in its relative participation in Guatema-
la’s imports in semi-Þ nished products through special regimes, going from 
3% in 2002 to about 13% in 2004. Almost all the selected groups record 
huge negative trade balances, suggesting that Guatemala is a net importer 
of the inputs required in assembly activities. 
In the case of Nicaragua, it is not possible to analyze in detail the 
importance of trade in semi-Þ nished products, since COMTRADE data do 
not include the special regimes. Nevertheless, the National Commission of 
Free Trade Zones (CNZF, Spanish acronym) publishes general statistics on 
trade through the free trade zones. Though limited, such statistics provide 
useful information on how this type of trade has evolved since 2002. Accor-
ding to CNZF, in 2002, its imports were over US$ 267 m, whereas exports 
went over US$ 346 m. In terms of value-added, the activities in free trade 
areas represented over US$ 111 m, with textiles and apparel accounting for 
about 90% of the total . In 2004, imports surpassed US$ 441 m - 65% more 
than those in 2002. Similarly, exports rose to US$596 m, about 72% more 
than 2002 exports. This trade is highly related to assembly activities. Table 
10 helps to identify what major products groups are of primary importance 
in trade of free zones. Apparel is by far the most representative group. In 
2004, it accounted for US$396 m, or over 65% of total Nicaraguan imports 
through free zones, and US$ 484 m or about 66% of total exports through 
this regime.
Besides the apparel industry, parts and accessories linked to the au-
tomotive sector have greatly gained importance in the trade through free 
zones. On the imports side, it went from 3% in 2004 to over 9% in 2005, 
whilst in the exports side, from 9% in 2004 to 28% in 2005. This might be 
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explained by the substantial foreign investments from multinationals - pro-
viders of renowned automakers -, which established base plants for light 
assembly of automotive manufactures. 
     
IV.4. The Central American dependence
All until now highlights that Guatemala and Nicaragua have not 
succeeded yet in diversifying their participation in fragmented processes. 
Even though they belong to the world apparel and textile chain, their par-
ticipation is merely limited to assembly activities. Furthermore, their Nor-
th-South trade pattern is largely dependent on a unique market, the US. 
Several factors have contributed to this. Low labor costs, trade and FDI 
policies and the location advantages are only a few. But this has several 
implications from an economic and policy point of view.
First, from 2001 to 2003, Guatemala held a steady but small share 
of 2.3% in the total US imports of apparel and textiles (see Table 11). Yet, 
since 2005, this share has quickly declined, reaching only 1.8% of the US 
market by the end of 2006. Nicaragua’s share is even smaller. Moreover, 
spite that it increased from 0.5% in 2001 to 0.9% in 2006, it remains rather 
small yet. This suggests that as long as Nicaragua and Guatemala remain 
conÞ ned to a unique market, they will also stay highly exposed to US po-
licies, which might unexpectedly destabilize their economies. Hence, it 
highlights the importance for these economies to deÞ ne policy measures 
towards attaining a diversiÞ ed North-South production sharing pattern.
Second, Guatemala and Nicaragua face huge competition in apparel 
and textiles. Their share in the world market of apparel and textiles is not 
only threatened by China but also by their neighbors.  Analyzing the shares 
of their closer competitors in the US market of apparel and textiles, we 
Þ nd that, in a global perspective, the share of Central American countries 
has decreased in the US imports in apparel and textiles. However, Table 11 
shows that Honduras holds a higher share in the US market than Guatema-
la. In this sense, it puts forward the urgency that Guatemala implements 
policy measures aimed at recovering its share in the US market, as well as 
enhancing its competitiveness.
For Nicaragua, the picture looks even more complex, since it is 
one of the countries with less penetration in the US market of apparel and 
textiles. Yet, taking into account that Nicaragua is increasing its relative 
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Table 11
Trends in US apparel and textiles imports from Central America
Source: OfÞ cial statistics of the US Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration 
OfÞ ce of Textiles and apparel
participation, supported by the temporary beneÞ ts granted by CAFTA, the 
country should not disregard the implementation of measures towards the 
strengthening of its competitiveness, as a mechanism to enhance its share 
in the world  market of apparel and textiles. 
Finally, the US keeps a very restrictive trade policy, which leads 
most Central American companies engaged in production sharing to have 
an incentive for minimizing their local purchases of inputs, since only 
components made in the US are exempts from imports duties when the 
Þ nished product is shipped back there. As a result, the integration between 
export-oriented activities and the local economy is being hindered, limiting 
the usefulness of production sharing as a stepping-stone to higher stages of 
industrialization. This also shows up the importance that these economies 
search for new opportunities to connect themselves to other world chains 
of production.   
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Sharing production has become a key feature of the world economy. 
It raises important implications for the development of the economies that 
can participate in it, but it also decreases the opportunities for those coun-
tries out of the process. 
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Imports (millions of $) Share (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
WORLD 70240 72183 77434 83310 89205 93277
Honduras 2348 2444 2507 2678 2629 2445 3.3 3,4 3,2 3,2 2,9 2,6
Guatemala 1614 1669 1773 1959 1831 1678 2.3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,1 1,8
Dominican Republic 2274 2173 2128 2066 1855 1550 3.2 3 2,7 2,5 2,1 1,7
El Salvador 1646 1709 1758 1757 1646 1433 2.3 2,4 2,3 2,1 1,8 1,5
Nicaragua 374 433 484 595 716 879 0.5 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9
Costa Rica 753 730 594 524 492 479 1.1 1 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,5
Total Central America 9.5 9,3 8,7 8,3 7,3 6,5
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This paper constituted a Þ rst attempt to assess the importance of 
sharing production for four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Further research must necessarily be done to 
capture the essence and real effects of this phenomenon in each of them. 
The four countries studied have reached their insertion, or lack 
of, in production sharing processes by following different trade patterns. 
Guatemala and Nicaragua exhibit a clear North-South trade pattern. No-
netheless, their share in fragmented chains of production is still small, and 
threatened not only by a huge international competition but also by their 
strict dependence on a unique market. Brazil has consolidated a modest 
participation in a few production chains, holding a more diversiÞ ed North–
South trade pattern. Argentina has attained a reasonable participation in the 
automotive chain of production, but its insertion in other chains seems still 
quite limited. It shows a more South-South trade pattern, exposing it to a 
certain degree of dependence on its South American neighbors.
In a broader perspective, though Brazil stands somewhat better and 
the Caribbean countries worse, the four economies share a similar inser-
tion. All are small (or very small) exporters of parts and components, as 
well as small importers of them (Brazil, here, being the exception). All are 
big importers of semi-Þ nished, and big (to very big) exporters of Þ nal con-
sumption goods. They are also big (or “small to big”) exporters of semi-Þ -
nished, but, with the exception of the car industry, these are barely proces-
sed commodities or natural products, with a low value-added. Drawn, as it 
was, from so different countries, this common evidence suggests that, as 
regards international fragmentation, Latin America remains close to mid-
gets, and quite far from the champions.
Policy implications of the above are manifold. They range from the 
pattern of the division of labor in the continent to the sustainability of each 
individual country trade ß ows. Nowadays better times for most Latin Ame-
rican economies seem to be the moment to address a courageous rethinking 
of this situation. This should contemplate a dual objective. Improve the 
present insertion in global chains, while creating more employment oppor-
tunities inside each country and strengthening the links among the different 
economies in the continent. Reconcile both is neither obvious, though nor 
impossible. 
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